Hannah Arendt''s sense of history by Oosten, Wouter-Jan
Hannah Arendt’s sense of history 
 




Leidschrift, jaargang 19, nummer 3, december 2004 
Hannah Arendt wrote a biography of a Jewish woman who lived in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Arendt wrote about totalitarianism and 
its roots in earlier history, and also about Ancient Athens and Rome. 
Usually, she did not provide for all the facts nor present a balanced image of 
the past. Arendt was not a historian but a political theorist. On the other 
hand, several political scientists thought that she was a hostage of (classical) 
history and out of touch with the present. They stated that Arendt held 
unrealistic views regarding current politics. What, then, was she doing? 
Arendt’s sense of history is discussed in this article: why she made sense of 
history, how she made sense of history and what her sense of history was. 
 In the first section the question of how to study (historical/political) 
phenomena for history writing is briefly explored. Three approaches to 
historical research are distinguished: a systematic approach that makes 
history a positive science, an interpretative approach that makes history an 
art and an approach that mixes the two. Science has its merits, in particular 
if cause and effect have their way and if a large number of phenomena can 
be researched. An interpretative approach seeks to make sense of unique, 
complex, emergent and contingent phenomena. Arendt herself was 
concerned with totalitarianism and Shoah, and with the ‘flaw’ of modernity. 
That raises the question of how to study historical phenomena for 
contemporary politics. Arendt looked for meaning in history.  
 In the next sections Arendt’s historical themes are discussed: the 
unfolding of modernity and its destructive side, Ancient political experience 
and the development of philosophy. In the concluding part Arendt’s 
approach is held out to historians, emphasising that they bear responsibility 
to discuss what history means to the contemporary world. 
 
 
A persistent question: how to study phenomena in history? 
 
History became a discipline when German historians first developed the 
notion of critical examination of historical sources. During the nineteenth 
century this critical attitude gained ground. French historians were, perhaps, 
among the last to continue storytelling in disregard of systematic research in 
archives and the authenticity of documents. But Leopold von Ranke and his 




followers, in spite of their critical and impartial intentions, were not without 
bias: historians still only focused on politics. Historical narrative featured 
kings and heroes, by which historians tended to reduce a society to its ruling 
elite. In the following century historians of many colours tried to address 
this bias. Karl Lamprecht and the Annales historians deserve much credit for 
the reorientation that shed light upon common folk and economics. They 
studied for instance patterns of land-use and population trends, material 
conditions and behaviour rather than ideas. This discipline of history 
requires aids such as statistics. Lamprecht and Annales historians added fuel 
to the existing debate concerning the nature or function of the historical 
discipline.1 Do historians examine handed-down narratives, reaching deeper 
understanding by discursive means? Or do they gather facts; line up 
hypotheses to discover laws? Does history belong to the humanities or the 
sciences? We touch upon a persistent question: how do we study specific 
(political) phenomena for history?   
 If we conceive history as being a systematic discipline, we can state, 
as Robert Fruin did:  
 
Indien wij met den aard van eenig mensch volkomen bekend waren 
en even volkomen met al de invloeden, elk in zijn juiste kracht, die 
op hem werken, wij zouden zijn handeling met evenveel zekerheid 
voorzien als wij een natuurverschijnsel voorzien, welks oorzaken wij 
volkomen kennen. Daarover kan in onzen tijd geen twijfel bestaan. 
En wat waar is van een enkel mensch, is ook waar van een 
vereeniging van menschen, van de maatschappij. Het bestaan van 
wetten op dit gebied mag dus niet worden ontkend.2 
 
Fruin himself admitted that research was slow to reveal the laws of history. 
However, he never drew the conclusion sketched by Chris Lorenz:  
 
Nu kunnen positivisten nog een eeuw de historici en sociale 
wetenschappers aansporen om wetten te gaan zoeken, maar erg veel 
wervende kracht heeft zo’n aansporing vermoedelijk niet. De 
verklaring dat de historici en sociale wetenschappers zo weinig 
wetmatige verklaringen opstellen omdat hun wetenschappen 
                                                 
1 H. Beliën en G.J. van Setten ed., Geschiedschrijving in de twintigste eeuw. Discussie zonder eind 
(Amsterdam 1996) 15-38, 107-114, 181-239.  
2 Citation from a speech reproduced in: G. Harmsen, Inleiding tot de geschiedenis (Baarn 1968) 
109. 




kennelijk fundamenteel van de exacte wetenschappen verschillen 
wint in de loop van de tijd aan overtuigingskracht.3 
 
Historical sources do not allow much scientific experimentation because 
they are limited in number, disorganised (contaminated) and fragile. Political 
scientist Paul Valkenburgh was aware of this: 
 
Veelal immers worden alle gegevens die van één of ander historisch 
gebeuren beschikbaar zijn, volledig benut om van dat gebeuren een 
geschiedenisbeeld te ontwerpen. Mogelijkheden tot verifiëring van 
dat beeld blijven er zodoende niet over, want al het materiaal is 
gebruikt. Hoogstens kan er nog sprake zijn van een hergroepering 
van de gegevens doch een dergelijke nieuwe poging tot reconstructie 
van het verleden berust dikwijls meer op het vermogen tot literaire 
vormgeving, psychologische invoeling en esthetische waardering van 
de desbetreffende historicus dan op objectiverende en exacte 
wetenschappelijke maatstaven. Goede en duidelijke criteria voor de 
juistheid van een geschiedenisbeeld ontbreken daardoor. De 
Einmaligkeit van de historische gebeurtenissen plaatst ons voor 
interessante methodische problemen.4 
 
Another political scientist, Jan van Putten, explained that historians study 
change and conflict whilst political scientists study order.5 Does such a 
distinction help to decide how to study totalitarianism and Shoah? The 
horrors would indeed be for storytellers to relate, for historians to study. 
For their part, social scientists would for instance study the Second World 
War as a stage in the development of military technology, or as a phase in 
international relations. In social science, phenomena can be seen either as 
functional elements or ignored and left to other disciplines because they do 
not fit into the larger picture. 
 Could a phenomenon as Shoah be studied within the frame of social 
science at all? Zygmunt Bauman blamed sociologists for not taking into 
account the consequences of Shoah for civilisation and for other 
                                                 
3 C. Lorenz, De constructie van het verleden. Een inleiding in de theorie van de geschiedenis (Amsterdam 
1987) 72. 
4 P. Valkenburgh, Inleiding tot de politicologie. Problemen van maatschappij en macht (Amsterdam 
1968) 65. 
5 J. van Putten, Politiek. Een realistische visie (Utrecht 1994) 20. 




conceptions dear to them.6 Sociologists, like political scientists, labelled the 
horrors of Nazism ‘aberrations’ but failed to rethink modernity. These 
social scientists consider themselves ‘engineers of society’ and dislike others 
pointing out flaws in ‘their’ society. Beyond giving an extended description, 
what could political scientists and Bauman’s sociologists say next? How 
could researchers hope to fit phenomena that are unique, complex, 
emergent and contingent into a system? Bauman, however, did recognize 
that some historians and theologians did start to reflect upon their common 
heritage. 
If we draw the conclusion that systematic history is unfruitful, we can 
conceive history as an interpretative discipline. Such an approach also 
follows from Johan Huizinga’s definition of history as ‘(…) de geestelijke 
vorm, waarin een cultuur zich rekenschap geeft van haar verleden.’7 One 
wonders what Huizinga would have thought of postmodernist approaches 
to history that reveal patterns of domination and produce ‘micro-stories’. 
To avoid the extremes of either positivism or relativism we can also 
conceive of history as a double-edged discipline: ‘Disinterested intellectual 
curiosity is the life-blood of real civilisation. (…) Truth is the criterion of 
historical study; but its impelling motive is poetic. Its poetry consists in its 
being true. There we find the synthesis of the scientific and literary views of 
history.’8 
If the peculiarity of historical objects obstructs science, what are 
historians to do except practise themselves in exegesis? With that approach 
they have partners outside their discipline: in theology, law and philosophy. 
Interpretative history may be based on the epistemological claim that 
phenomena as unique and complex as totalitarianism and Shoah cannot be 
analysed with existing categories, a claim that can be a reason as much as an 
ex post facto justification.9 That claim does not exclude that positive science is 
suitable for other, more ordinary phenomena. Interpretative history may 
also be based on the ontological claim that history is not a system in which 
laws have it their way. Hannah Arendt, to whom this article now turns, read 
philosophy and theology and called herself a ‘political theorist’. She was 
                                                 
6 Z. Bauman, ‘Sociology after the Holocaust’, The British journal of sociology 39-4 (1988) 469-
497. 
7 J. Huizinga, Cultuurhistorische verkenningen (Haarlem 1929) 166. 
8 G. Macaulay Trevelyan, English ocial history. A survey of six centuries (London 1986) 10 and 12 
respectively. 
9 J.G. Gunnell, ‘Interpretation and the history of political theory. Apology and 
Epistemology’, The American political science review 76-2 (1982) 317-27. 




certainly not systematic, if that implies determinism. In her view, people 
create their world and its history, and they bear responsibility for it. In 
Arendt’s work, the historians’ persistent question finds a mirror image in 
the question ‘How to study historical phenomena for contemporary 
politics?’ Let it be clear that she looked for meaning, not causality. 
 
 
Hannah Arendt’s historical themes 
 
Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) studied philosophy with Martin Heidegger and 
Karl Jaspers. She chose Augustine’s conception of love as the topic of her 
PhD thesis. In 1933 she left her native country Germany as it became 
dangerous for her mother and herself: they were Jews and had associated 
themselves with the political left. Arendt stayed in Paris for a while until she 
got the chance to go to New York. From 1941 onward she lived in the 
United States. In her work Arendt coped with totalitarian government and 
Shoah. She did not write a history of Nazism nor process the Second World 
War into fiction, but made it her mission to 
understand the rise of Nazism and to 
formulate and promote the principle of an 
alternative regime. That principle is not the 
worn-out concept of freedom, but political 
action that is original and generative.  
Three historical themes can be 
distinguished in Arendt’s writing. In The 
origins of totalitarianism, published in 1951, 
and in The human condition, published in 
1958, she discussed the unfolding of 
modernity. In her 1958 masterpiece she 
returned to the political experience of 
Ancient Athens and Rome. That 
experience can and must regenerate our 
present society, Arendt thought. She used 
classical history as the source for a durable modern existence. There is a 
third theme throughout Arendt’s work. She criticized philosophy for having 
turned its back on the here and now. These themes are further discussed in 
the next sections. 
Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) 
 




Classical history and totalitarianism 
 
For Arendt, the Ancient political experience was an antidote to 
totalitarianism. Inspired by the models of oikos and polis she distinguished 
between the private and public realm.10 The metabolism of man and nature, 
human procreation and emotions are set in the private realm. Political 
action takes place in the public realm. The public realm is like a stage upon 
which men show and pronounce themselves to their fellows and where 
deliberation occurs. Action characterizes free men: by action men establish 
and confirm their freedom and in action men feel their power. Action 
preserves the framework that makes free action possible: the play defines 
the stage. Dialogue between men starts from the diversity amongst them 
and accommodates that diversity. By their actions men create history, as 
words and deeds are remembered. By acting in concert man creates a world 
that is more lasting than the products of the working artisan or the 
labouring peasant. And yet, acting men cannot create the world according to 
their own design. The results of action are unpredictable. Uncertainty is 
compensated by the human capacities of promise and forgiveness. The 
plurality of society and the unknown future are consequences of natality, by 
which Arendt means the continuous entry of new people into the world, 
human initiative and ingenuity.  
 Arendt has been reproached for the alien and one-sided history she 
allegedly wrote. Ancient Athenians and Roman republicans cannot be used 
as our model, because we live in an incomparable age. Although George 
Kateb shared Arendt’s ideal of politics, he questioned the necessity of 
history to recover that ideal because elements of it are alive in our time as 
well.11 Moreover, Arendt seemed to pass over the fact that the society of 
free Greeks lived off women and slaves and that the Roman legislators were 
also militaristic oppressors of both West and East. How she retold Ancient 
history is a stuffy scholastic issue compared to her contemporary studies 
that became the subject of political controversy.  
In The origins of totalitarianism Arendt left, from a historical or 
sociological point of view, the straight and narrow. If she dit not irritate her 
readers, she at least puzzled them. How relevant was British imperialism to 
the rise of fascism? Could she not have studied the position of Jews in the 
                                                 
10 R.T. Tsao, ‘Arendt against Athens. Rereading The human condition’, Political theory 30-1 (2002) 
97-123. 
11 G. Kateb, Hannah Arendt. Politics, conscience, evil (Oxford 1984) 2. 




Habsburg Empire more than she did the Dreyfus affair? Was she truly 
unable to write the companion volume on communism? And if her book 
was not an ordinary study of history, why did she bother with all those 
references to letters, speeches and diaries? When she discussed the fate of 
Jews under German occupation, her ideas concerning Jewish councils were 
perhaps phrased rather blunt. The ‘banality of evil’ she spoke of in her 
newspaper reports on the trial against a Nazi kidnapped by the Israelis and 
in her book afterwards, Eichmann in Jerusalem, was easily misunderstood and 
perhaps unfair to the prosecution.12 Arendt’s views concerning the case of 
Palestine were unrealistic as she promoted the cohabitation of Jews and 
Arabs. During the Jewish immigration and the first years of the state of 
Israel, however, the Arabs were unwilling to recognise an organised Jewish 
community. Even if nowadays the state of Israel and the Palestinian 
authority communicate, developments within the Jewish community make it 
unlikely that Arendt’s general ideal of politics will ever be realised: Israel 
moved away from participatory democracy and secularism.13 Beside offering 
faulty history and unseasoned analyses of current politics, Arendt was an 
alien even at a personal level: like most European refugees who came to the 
U.S. during the Second World War she was too traumatised to perceive 
American society with an open mind. Those refugees never fully settled 
there.14 
In letters to her husband and other intimate writings, Arendt showed 
herself to be very critical of others and somewhat aggressive. A lack of 
consideration for other people’s feelings may have harmed her work and its 
reception. As a political theorist Arendt too often insufficiently explained 
herself. The epistemology behind The origins of totalitarianism was not 
presented with the book, but can be found in drafts, memos and letters.15 In 
the 1950 preface to the first edition she did state the following: 
 
The conviction that everything that happens on earth must be 
comprehensible to man can lead to interpreting history by 
                                                 
12 S. Benhabib, ‘Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem’ in: D. Villa ed., The Cambridge companion to 
Hannah Arendt (Cambridge 2000) 65-85. 
13 U. Ben-Eliezer, ‘The meaning of political participation in a nonliberal democracy. The 
Israeli experience’, Comparative politics 25-4 (1993) 397-412. 
14 W. Laqueur, ‘The Arendt cult: Hannah Arendt as political commentator’, Journal of 
contemporary history 33-4 (1998) 483-496. 
15 L.J. Disch, ‘More truth than fact. Storytelling as critical understanding in the writings of 
Hannah Arendt’, Political theory 21-4 (1993) 665-694. 




commonplaces. Comprehension does not mean denying the 
outrageous, deducing the unprecedented from precedents, or 
explaining phenomena by such analogies and generalities that the 
impact of reality and the shock of experience are no longer felt. It 
means, rather, examining and bearing consciously the burden, which 
our century has placed on us – neither denying its existence nor 
submitting meekly to its weight. Comprehension, in short, means the 
unpremeditated, attentive facing up to, and resisting of, reality – 
whatever it may be. (…) We can no longer afford to take that which 
was good in the past and simply call it our heritage, to discard the 
bad and simply think of it as a dead load, which by itself time will 
bury in oblivion. The subterranean stream of Western history has 
finally come to the surface and usurped the dignity of our tradition. 
This is the reality in which we live. And this is why all efforts to 
escape from the grimness of the present into nostalgia for a still 
intact past, or into the anticipated oblivion of a better future, are 
vain.16 
 
Totalitarianism and Shoah were unprecedented, how could they be analysed 
along the lines of familiar categories? According to Arendt, the Third Reich 
succeeded to change reality until reality suited Nazi mythology, no matter 
the inconsistencies of the various myths. Jews were feeble misfits, who 
nevertheless posed a grave danger because they conspired against and 
infiltrated decent society in order to gain world domination. Jews were 
vermin and the conditions under which they lived in the ghettos proved it. 
To remove them was not murder but sanitation. In a sense, they were not 
even killed since no citizen was a witness to that and the camps where the 
Jews were sent were called ‘work camps’. Also, the category of ‘murder’ 
refers to an individual victim. Shoah was not just a quantitative leap from 
murder, it was qualitatively different. Jewish individuals and identities had 
been erased, no Jew had a biography: he was a Jew and no more. Jews were 
not even recognised as having committed a particular crime, even if the 
accusation would have been false. The Nazi regime undermined fact to such 
a degree that even today some ideologists deny the six million Jewish dead. 
 Arendt thought that if regular social science or history were at all 
possible regarding this regime, it would still not succeed to denounce it. 
What marks totalitarianism is its meaning for humanity and that cannot be 
                                                 
16 H. Arendt, The origins of totalitarianism (San Diego 1979; revised third edition of the text 
originally published in 1951) viii and ix respectively. 




explained in an objective way, even if such objectivity had not been 
shattered. Therefore she did not report the events but related a story that 





The unfolding of modernity, another historical theme in Arendt’s work, 
keeps men busy but discourages action. As the Roman Empire declined, life 
became more parochial. Grand politics ceased to exist; men no longer cared 
for their world and its politics. Village communities and agricultural 
economics slowly gave way to towns and trade, eventually to cities and 
industry. Feudal regimes were originally based on personal ties but soon 
became systems of landed interest. The fact that property was at the basis of 
political rule did not change after the Middle Ages. An urban business class 
took over state power and served its own interests. Modern citizens did not 
revive the Ancient notion of politics for sake of fame and for sake of 
politics itself. The labour movement may have put forward legitimate 
claims, but changes in the allocation of wealth do not change the character 
of politics. For Arendt, the noble art of political action had been lost. The 
private realm had been expanded to the social realm, the world had, in 
essence, become one big oikos. The one thing set apart from everyday life, 
according to Arendt, was religion. Christianity could by its very nature not 
function like the public realm, it taught not love for the world but love (if 
not fear) for God. As Arendt explained in Eichmann in Jerusalem, he who 
dutifully does his work in the social realm and who is a loving father 
privately may yet neglect his responsibility for the world and facilitate evil. 
Individual citizens should not congregate only to promote their material 
interest and to put their mind at rest. They should care for the public good, 
question their own opinions and excel in free action. Citizens should not 
abandon action to professional politicians. As early as in the 1830s, Alexis 
de Tocqueville observed how vulnerable an affluent society of equal and 
free people actually is.17 Liberty is easily sacrificed to bourgeois indulgence. 
Karl-Heinz Breier indeed includes Arendt’s argument in his own objections 
                                                 
17 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (London 1994; an Everyman’s Library reprint of 
the unabridged English translation prepared by Phillips Bradley for Alfred A. Knopf’s 
edition of 1945; the two parts of the original De la démocratie en Amérique were published 
consecutively in the 1830s).  




to our present consumerism.18 Arendt not only warned citizens and 





The development of philosophy, a third historical theme in Arendt’s work, 
brought with it an attitude of unworldliness. The main body of philosophy 
had not concerned itself much with the human world. Metaphysic works 
such as Georg Hegel’s Die Phänomenologie des Geistes or works of logic such as 
Gottlob Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik are not the most obvious ways to 
recognise and maintain the human world, according to Arendt. Thinkers 
positioned themselves as monastics of sorts, seeking eternal or universal 
truths. They enjoyed their Kultur but did not take up responsibility for the 
world. If thinkers were not actively guilty, their indifference was accessory 
to terror. Too many intellectuals from Germany’s conservative and liberal 
elites adjusted to Nazi rule. Of those philosophers who, throughout modern 
history did analyse the external world and prescribed policies for its 
betterment, many were ideologists. They sought to impose a foreign idea 
upon the world and did not respect the plurality of the public realm. The 
(often violent) means of impositioning foreign ideas on a varied population 
have made many victims throughout history. For instance in communism, 
to paraphrase George Orwell, the beasts of every land and clime had been 
promised the golden future time. What communism provided, however, 
was the idea that ‘All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal 
than others.’19 Arendt was disappointed by the anti-political character of 
Karl Marx’ work which focuses more on anonymous socio-economic 
structures than on the political actions of free men.  
The anti-political attitude perhaps started with Plato’s aversion to 
political men who sentenced and killed Socrates. In Plato’s ideal system of 
government philosophers would rule.20 Their rule would see to it that the 
population abstains from wrong acts and thoughts. Plato failed to 
understand that if man is so constricted that he cannot err, man is also 
                                                 
18 K.H. Breier, Arendt (Rotterdam 2002; a translation by H. Daalder of the text originally 
published in 2001 as Hannah Arendt zur Einführing,) 30-51.  
19 G. Orwell, Animal farm. A fairy story (Groningen 1993; a Wolters-Noordhoff reprint of the 
text originally published in 1945) 99. 
20 Plato, The republic (Harmondsworth 1987; a Penguin revised second edition of the English 
translation by Desmond Lee originally published in 1955).  




unable to leap forward into the future. Surprise and innovation are essential 
to the quality of human life.21 Mediaeval Christian doctrine turned the mind 
of man to his afterlife, accepting misery on earth. Sure enough, 
modernisation with its trade and industry increased wealth. But the 
improvement of life was material and superficial. The twentieth century 
wars showed how unstable and dangerous the modern condition is and how 
thoughtless and vulnerable it makes mankind. 
Arendt criticised what she called ‘stray’ philosophers, thinkers who, 
in her view, had no eyes for their immediate surroundings. She contrasted 
unworldliness with the ancient notion of glory.22 A Greek hero on the 
battlefield or a Roman legislator was not obsessed by another world, be it 
the afterlife with God or the system of the universe. The Ancients wanted 
to excel here and now so that their fellow citizens would see and respect 
them, so that their society would remember them. To aspire to the 
remembrance of one’s deeds or words, fame amongst humans, is very 
different from craving for eternity with God. The point is that in order to 
gain fame amongst men, there has to be a society in which people act and 
speak in concert. Public aspiration maintains the body politic. 
Arendt was certainly not the only one to criticise mainstream 
philosophy or culture. Ernst Jünger, a conservative revolutionary since his 
First World War experience, also favoured human deeds to rational 
abstractions. Martin Heidegger also recognised man’s immediate 
surroundings.23 These thinkers generally turned to aesthetics and 
destruction, in sharp contrast with Arendt’s ethics and human creation. 
Their ideal of battlefield heroes or Sein-zum-Ende would not deter Plato. We 
might say that Arendt did not want to erase or cleanse modern society, she 
wanted to heal it. 
 
From Nietzsche to Jünger and then Goebbels, the modernist credo 
was the triumph of spirit and will over reason and the subsequent 
fusion of this will to an aesthetic mode. If aesthetic experience alone 
justifies life, morality is suspended and desire has no limits. (...) As 
                                                 
21 M. Verhoeven, Boreling en beginner. Nataliteit bij Hannah Arendt (Zoetermeer 2003).  
22 H. Arendt, The human condition (Chicago 1998; a reprint of the text originally published in 
1958, now with an introduction by M. Canovan) 17-21, 56. H. Arendt, Between past and future. 
Six exercises in political thought (London 1961; first edition) 41-90. H. Arendt, On violence (San 
Diego 1970; first edition) 68. 
23 M. Heidegger, Over denken, bouwen, wonen (Nijmegen 1991; a translation by H.M. Berghs of 
the text originally published in 1954 as Vorträge und Aufsätze).  




aesthetic standards replaced moral norms, modernism indulged a 
fascination for horror and violence as a welcome relief to bourgeois 





Hannah Arendt, although not a historian, collected historical material and 
sketched images of history. Her approach was not scientific in the sense of 
collecting facts and fitting those into a system of known categories, thereby 
tuning the system. Nazism had ridiculed historical facts and cultural 
certainties. In a way, Adolf Eichmann was not guilty of murder. Modernity, 
the meta-system of analysis, is flawed. Arendt told a story to make people 
understand that modernity has led to a passive and vulnerable society. She 
also told a story of how an Ancient conception of politics vitalises society. 
Active citizens confirm their own identities and maintain the world for 
future generations by means of speech. This requires a public realm where 
deliberation takes place, where the plurality of society can be expressed. 
Arendt could tell her stories and inspire a public thanks to her historical 
imagination. Historians may follow her lead. They can feed the historical 
imagination and enrich public debate with ideas from the past. If there are 
no laws of history that we can learn to live by, we need an open mind to 
explore and discuss possible futures. If philosophers keep aloof, it is all the 
more urgent that historians take up some responsibility for the world we 
share. Historical research is, and should be more than a machine that runs 
on to produce historical facts, just like people should not - like Eichman - 
unthinkingly follow orders by the powers that be just because ‘Befehl ist 
Befehl’. After they have straightened out their ‘facts’, historians should 
proceed to wonder and to discuss what that history means to the 
contemporary world. 
 
                                                 
24 J. Herf, Reactionary modernism. Technology, culture, and politics in Weimar and the Third Reich 
(Cambridge 1984) 12. 
